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Supervising Professors: John Doggett, Management; David Adelman, School of Law 
 
Why is it that states like California and New York, which have some of the strongest 
environmental regulations and renewable energy incentive programs in the country, have had 
less success incorporating clean power onto the grid than their relatively laissez-faire 
counterparts like Texas and Iowa? Using a combination of econometric analysis and case 
studies into the development process, this thesis evaluates how land use regulations influence 
the renewable energy industry – and, consequently, how to maximize the economic value of 
state-level incentives. 
The project is divided into three sections. The first provides an overview and history of how the 
nature of the renewable energy industry came to vary so much from state to state. In particular, 
it explores the difference between regulated and deregulated electricity markets, as well as the 
emerging rift between distributed renewable power (user-level; for example, rooftop solar 
panels) and utility-scale renewable installations (think solar farms). The second section 
describes the econometric component of the thesis, which evaluates which characteristics of 
land development – including the presence of endangered species, average land value, and 
quantity of government-owned property – have the greatest impact on project development, as 
well as which states’ renewable incentive programs are helped and hurt the most by these 
underlying qualities. The third section discusses the policy implications of the study, offering 
recommendations for how states can improve their incentives and touching on how federal 
interventions and technological advancements can change the conversation moving forward. 
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Chapter I: Yesterday 
An introduction to the history of renewable energy markets in the U.S. and an overview 
of where the wind and solar industries stand today 
Section A: Overview and methodology 
The windswept plains of Texas and Iowa are dotted with spinning turbines that harness 
the energy of powerful gusts into usable electricity. But driving through other portions of the 
Midwest, or the blustery Rocky Mountains, you would be hard-pressed to spot any propeller 
blades whirring over the horizon — untold millions of dollars in value literally vanishing into 
thin air. In September 2016, Texas and Iowa generated more wind power than any other states in 
the country, with Texan turbines providing 3,923 megawatt-hours of electricity and Iowa’s 
producing 1,552. Meanwhile, Iowa’s neighbor Missouri generated just 87 MWh of wind power 
during the same period, and Wyoming — which has one of the highest potential wind capacities 
in the country — produced 277.1 
 In the same vein, the dry hills of Southern California are covered in solar panels, 
powering millions of the state’s homes and factories with the energy of its year-round sunshine. 
And yet Arizona, just one state over and renowned for its blistering deserts, produced over 
twenty times as much power from natural gas and coal than from solar photovoltaics in August 
2016.2 
 The lesson here is that, like so much else about its history and culture, America’s energy 
landscape is messy, nonuniform, and often illogical. That is because it is shaped not within the 
halls of the U.S. Congress or the Environmental Protection Agency, but rather by policies and 
                                                             
1 “Electric Power Monthly with Data for September 2016.” U.S. Energy Information Administration, November 
2016. Table 1.14-A. 
2 “Arizona State Profile and Energy Estimate.” U.S. Energy Information Administration, October 2016. 
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regulations established at the state and regional level. But the effect of these disparate regulatory 
climates goes further than determining whether or not renewable energy installations are 
developed in a specific part of the country. They also impact the magnitude of renewable grid 
penetration — in other words, what percentage of a state’s electric grid can be feasibly powered 
by renewable resources, and how close the state comes to reaching that theoretical limit. They 
determine whether renewable projects are developed on a distributed, or user-level, scale — 
rooftop solar panels, for example — or in the form of large solar and wind farms. And they 
influence the local cost of power, which is a large determinant of which resources supply that 
power. 
 While a number of analyses have sought to evaluate the effectiveness of particular 
statewide policies in boosting overall renewable penetration, there have been few attempts to 
compare which elements of the project development process have the greatest influence on 
whether or not an ostensibly pro-renewables policy works as designed. In light of this research 
gap, this paper evaluates how different barriers to property development affect the value of state-
level renewable incentive programs. There are two primary components to the project. The first 
component uses econometric analyses to evaluate how various property characteristics affect 
both the scale and nature of renewable deployment in each of the fifty states, including 
environmental, economic, and political variables. The second component consists of case studies 
into the project development process, built through numerous interviews with developers, 
financiers, and policymakers. Unlike the econometric project, the case studies focus on four 
impactful state-level policy areas within a few different U.S. independent system operator (ISO) 
regions with unusually high renewable penetration — most notably Texas and California. 
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I chose these locations because Texas has one of the most deregulated electricity markets 
in the country and a high penetration of utility-scale renewable power, whereas California has 
deployed a number of policy mechanisms and regulations that incentivize renewable deployment 
and distributed generation in particular. Thus, while the electric grids of both states have 
integrated more renewable power than anywhere else in the country, they have created vastly 
divergent business climates for developers and regulators to navigate, according to several 
developers and financiers interviewed for this project. Texas and California are also two of the 
only states whose energy markets are regulated and managed by their own independent system 
operators: respectively, the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) and California 
Independent System Operator (CAISO). 
For simplicity, I have divided each of the regulatory structures this thesis evaluates into 
four subcategories: 
Transmission infrastructure 
There are three power grids that distribute electricity in the United States. The Eastern 
and Western Interconnections span the regions opposite each side of the Rocky Mountains, and 
the ERCOT Interconnection supplies power for most of Texas (Fig. 1).3 
                                                             
3 Figure 1 source: Electric Reliability Council of Texas. 
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Figure 1 
 These grids are further subdivided into ISO regions, which are responsible for regulating 
the purchase, sale, and distribution of electricity in accordance with local laws, as well as for 
managing the day-to-day operations of the grid.4 
 
Figure 2 
                                                             
4 Figure 2 source: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. 
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It is these ISOs that are responsible for strategically deploying power lines so as to 
maintain widespread access to electricity while keeping costs under control. In essence, this 
mission is comprised of two responsibilities: transmission, which uses high-voltage power lines 
to transport electricity from generation facilities to load centers; and distribution, which uses 
low-voltage lines to distribute that power to consumers.5 
Because utility-scale wind and solar power are often sited far from load centers, systems 
with well-developed transmission networks are better equipped to integrate those resources into 
the grid at large. As such, the transmission networks most amenable to utility-scale renewables 
have (a) installed high-voltage lines capable of efficiently transmitting a large capacity of power, 
and (b) strategically located those lines so as to connect regions with strong wind and solar 
resources to major load centers. ERCOT is a paragon in this respect. In 2013, the organization 
completed a $7 billion network of 345 kilovolt direct-current lines6 running from remote areas 
like the Panhandle and West Texas, referred to as Competitive Renewable Energy Zones 
(CREZ), towards the state’s major cities.7 Since then, Texas’s wind power generation has 
increased by 60.43 percent relative to the 2013 baseline,8 despite concerns that the CREZ lines 
are already becoming congested due to the abundance of wind power developed in the region.9 
Distributed power, in contrast, is generated at a small scale and on an individual user 
level. As a result, systems that handle distributed power well are those with modern distribution 
networks, which include innovations like load-shifting incentives and demand response 
programs that help utilities manage their load more efficiently. While this paper does not discuss 
                                                             
5 Andrade, Juan, Baldick, Ross, “Estimation of Transmission Costs for New Generation,” White Paper UTEI/2016-
09-1, 2016, available at http://energy.utexas. edu/the-full-cost-of-electricity-fce/. 
6 For the sake of comparison, the typical alternating-current power line carries 69 kV of electric potential 
7 “Competitive Renewable Energy Zones (CREZ) Maps.” Public Utility Commission of Texas. Docket No. 35665, 
Attachment A. 
8 Energy Information Administration 
9 Martin, Richard. “In Texas Oil Country, Wind Is Straining the Grid.” MIT Technology Review, 6 August 2016. 
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methods of maximizing distributed renewable power, it does describe why states that have 
difficulty incentivizing utility-scale renewables often have a higher concentration of distributed 
resources.  
Land management 
Wind farms and utility-scale solar installations are land-intensive systems.10 As such, the 
costs of procuring property and obtaining all necessary building permits, as well as the time-cost 
of development, play an enormous role in determining whether a region is amenable to large 
renewable power generation facilities. While states can exert some degree of control over the 
permitting process and municipal governments are primarily responsible for zoning laws, there 
are two important market characteristics within the land management category that fall under 
federal jurisdiction. Firstly, property owned by the federal government and overseen by Bureau 
of Land Management is governed under different regulations than private or state-owned land. 
Secondly, the Endangered Species Act – and its state-level equivalents, like the notorious 
California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) – can preempt project development even on 
private property, which is part of the reason why building solar installations is easier even in 
relatively resource-poor East Texas than in California’s Mojave Desert.11 Chapter 2 goes into 
more detail on how different designations of land protection affect the development process. 
Taxes and incentives 
This subcategory includes both demand-side mechanisms, such as tax cuts and cash 
payouts to homeowners who choose to install solar panels, and supply-side mechanisms, like 
production and investment tax credits for companies that develop utility-scale renewable 
installations. It excludes the federal versions of the production and investment tax credits as well 
                                                             
10 Denholm, Paul, et al. “Land Use Requirements of Modern Wind Power Plants in the United States.” National 
Renewable Energy Laboratory, Technical Report, NREL/TP-6A2-45834, August 2009. 
11 Badichek, Gregg. “Resolving Conflicts Between Endangered Species Conservation and Renewable Energy Siting: 
Wiggle Room for Renewables?” Consilience: The Journal of Sustainable Development, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2015. 
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as Department of Energy-funded subsidies like the Advanced Research Projects Agency — 
Energy (ARPA-E), because those mechanisms are independent of state-level regulation. Because 
there is no consistent metric quantifying the value of these tax and incentive programs, this 
analysis uses an aggregation of state rankings compiled by trade associations and consultancies 
as a stand-in for the strength of a state’s renewable financing mechanisms. 
Electricity market design 
Unlike the previous three subcategories, electricity markets are not regulated by the states 
themselves. Instead, electricity markets are managed and operated by ISOs, which are 
nongovernmental organizations overseen by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC), with the exception of the wholly independent ERCOT. Because this paper’s emphasis 
lies on state-level policy initiatives, its analysis of ISO guidelines primarily focuses on 
decoupling and transmission buildout, which are the regulatory spaces under ISO jurisdiction 
over which states exert the greatest degree of control. 
Decoupling refers to the disaggregation of power generation, transmission, and 
distribution that began in the 1980s.12 Before that time, electricity markets in the U.S. were 
vertically integrated, with a single firm responsible for owning and operating power plants, 
transmitting that power into population centers, distributing it to consumers, and servicing the 
grid to prevent blackouts and disruptions. That business structure emerged around the turn of the 
20th century, when the federal government concluded that electric utilities, like telegraph lines 
and railroads, were “natural monopolies,” meaning that the public would be better served with a 
single company controlling every aspect of the electricity industry because of its high 
infrastructural barriers to entry. The theory was codified into law in the form of Public Utility 
                                                             
12 Tuttle, David P., Gülen, Gürcan, Hebner, Robert, King, Carey W., Spence, David B., Andrade, Juan, Wible, Jason 
A., Baldick, Ross, Duncan, Roger, “The History and Evolution of the U.S. Electricity Industry,” White Paper 
UTEI/2016-05-2, 2016, available at http://energy.utexas.edu/ the-full-cost-of-electricity-fce/. 2. 
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Holding Company Act in 1935, which ensured that utilities had monopoly control over their 
regions of operation.13 In exchange for their government-guaranteed control of the market, 
utilities had to relinquish the power to set power prices to local public utility commissions and 
ISOs, and they were heavily incentivized to build as much capacity as possible to bring 
electricity to those who lacked it.14 
But in the 1970s, the public benefit of the natural monopoly began to decline. Most of the 
country had already been electrified, but the demand for power was still increasing, which 
encouraged utilities to commission bigger and more expensive power plants. Around the same 
time, the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil embargoes and Three Mile 
Island meltdown, both discussed later in this chapter, pushed utilities to shift away from 
petroleum and nuclear fuel as electricity-generating resources and invest in energy technologies 
with smaller generating capacities like hydropower and natural gas.15 As a result of these shifts 
in the market, the need for power providers to own generation facilities declined. In response, 
Congress passed the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) in 1978, which paved the 
way for states to deregulate the utility industry through the 1980s and 1990s. The decoupling 
wave began in states that stood the most to gain from instituting a competitive market for power 
generation: those with high power prices or a strong resource base for natural gas or renewables 
(Fig. 3).16 However, a number of states that fit that description — most notably California — 
suspended the deregulation process following the Enron scandal in 2001, discussed in further 
detail in Chapter 2. 
                                                             
13 Tuttle 5. 
14 Kihm, Steve, et al. “You Get What You Pay For: Moving Toward Value in Utility Compensation, Part 1 – 
Revenue and Profit.” America’s Power Plan, June 2015. 
15 Tuttle 8. 
16 Figure 3 source: U.S. Energy Information Administration 
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Figure 3 
In addition to decoupling, the analysis of market mechanisms will include a discussion of 
market factors that influence which resources are able to generate the cheapest electricity in a 
given region. For example, capacity markets, which incentivize plants that can theoretically 
provide large quantities of power, and ramping markets, which incentivize plants that can 
quickly change their power output, can be used to subsidize the types of natural gas plants 
needed to ameliorate the effects of wind and solar variability. 
Section conclusion 
This method of evaluation leads to a conclusion that evaluates whether certain policies or 
combinations thereof could benefit less developed renewable energy markets throughout the 
country, as well as which policies or policy combinations are region-specific and likely not 
replicable. An example of the former case, discussed further in Chapter 2, is Texas’s 
combination of lax permitting regulations and lack of a capacity market, which can reduce power 
prices and facilitate renewable development in any state with a low population density and strong 
solar and wind resources. An example of the latter case, also discussed in Chapter 2, is 
California’s relative lack of investment in transmission. While CAISO has lobbied for the 
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creation of an integrated Western grid, its sparse intrastate HVDC infrastructure has not hindered 
renewable deployment as it might elsewhere. The two primary causes underlying that anomaly 
are somewhat unique to California: firstly, the proximity of the state’s power-generating regions 
to the population centers where that power is consumed reduces the need for high-voltage 
transmission; secondly, project development in California faces so many regulatory and 
environmental hurdles that the ISO’s impact on renewable penetration is limited. 
Section B: Overview of U.S. wind and solar industry 
Historical Roots 
The explosive growth of America’s wind and solar industry is a relatively recent 
phenomenon. At the beginning of the century, the U.S. had only 2,539 MW of wind capacity and 
138.8 MW of solar capacity installed17 – combining to generate just 0.13 percent of America’s 
electricity.18 By 2016, those numbers had grown to 82,171 MW of wind and 35,800 MW of 
solar, enough to supply 6.9 percent of the nation’s power needs (Fig. 4).19 20 The majority of this 
rapid development is market-driven, with the cost of wind and solar inputs declining rapidly 
while the price of operating coal and nuclear plants rises. But it took a series of policy initiatives 
beginning in the 1970s to lay the groundwork for the renewables market to emerge in the first 
place. 
                                                             
17 See citation for Figure 4 
18 “Electric Power Monthly, March 2001.” U.S. Energy Information Administration. 9. 
19 “Electric Power Monthly, February 2017.” U.S. Energy Information Administration. 
20 Figure 4 source: Wind: “Installed Wind Capacity.” WINDExchange, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable 
Energy, U.S. Department of Energy. Solar: Compiled via U.S. Solar Market Insight reports, Solar Energy Industries 
Association. 
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Figure 4 
In 1973, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) caused a 
pandemonium in the U.S. economy that would shape American energy policy for decades to 
come. In response to American support for Israel during that year’s Yom Kippur War, OPEC 
embargoed its oil exports to the U.S., cutting off 35 percent of the nation’s petroleum supply.21 
The embargo is largely remembered for its effects at the gas pump, which inspired new fuel-
efficiency standards for vehicles and created a political impetus to find oil from non-OPEC 
sources.22 But its aftermath also brought seismic changes to America’s electricity sector, which 
at the time derived nearly 20 percent of its power from petroleum — compared to less than one 
percent today.23 24 In anticipation of future supply disruptions from OPEC, as well as projected 
                                                             
21 Lovins, Amory. “What Did the 1973 Oil Embargo Teach Us?” RMI Outlet, Rocky Mountain Institute. 17 October 
2013. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Logan, Jeffrey. “U.S. Power Sector Undergoes Dramatic Shift in Generation Mix.” Renewable Energy Project 
Finance, National Renewable Energy Laboratory. 26 February 2013. 
24 Muyskens, John, et al. “Mapping how the United States generates its electricity.” Washington Post, 29 March 
2017. 
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increases in demand stemming from population growth, Congress took steps to allow electric 
utilities to procure alternative sources of power, culminating in the passage of PURPA in 1978.25 
It was in this climate that physicist Amory Lovins popularized the concept of a “soft 
path” energy strategy, which emphasized “a rapid development of renewable energy sources 
matched in scale and in energy quality to end-use needs.”26 Lovins viewed centralized power 
generation as financially wasteful and energy-inefficient, and he subscribed to the now-quaint 
ideas that fossil energy reserves were quickly depleting and that the expansion of nuclear power 
would lead to nuclear arms proliferation.27 But his perspective’s publication by Foreign Affairs, 
an imprint of the Council on Foreign Relations, allowed for the idea of widespread deployment 
of wind and solar power to enter America’s political zeitgeist for the first time. 
Two years after PURPA was signed into law, Congress established the first federal 
renewable energy incentives under Title IV of the Energy Security Act, which established an 
investment program for solar developments as well as a pilot program to encourage states to 
develop pro-renewables programs of their own.28 In 1983, that state-level initiative culminated in 
Iowa’s passage of nation’s first renewable portfolio standard, which required its two investor-
owned utilities to commission a total of 105 MW of electricity from renewable sources 
beginning that same year.29 While development did not increase much beyond the proof-of-
concept stage through the rest of the decade, interest in solar and wind power increased again in 
the 1990s amid growing awareness of climate change, pollution, and the depletion of the ozone 
                                                             
25 Tuttle 7. 
26 Lovins, Amory. “Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken?” Foreign Affairs, October 1976. 
27 In 1982, Lovins cofounded the Rocky Mountain Institute, which is now one of America’s preeminent 
environmental think tanks. 
28 Energy Security Act, S.932, 96th U.S. Congress, 1979-80 sess. 
29 Alternative Energy Law of 1983, S.F. 380, 70th Iowa General Assembly, 1983 sess. 
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layer.30 In 1994, Minnesota adopted America’s second RPS, which required Xcel Energy to 
commission 225 MW of wind power by 1998.31 By 2000, nine other states had followed suit; 
today, 29 states and Washington, DC have renewable portfolio standards.32 
On the federal level, the Energy Policy Act of 1992 continued PURPA’s effort to 
separate power generation from transmission by requiring utilities to transport third-party power 
over their own lines, which allowed facilities smaller than utility-owned coal or nuclear plants to 
access a consumer base.33 The law also increased federal subsidies for renewable technologies, 
and its 2005 update established two separate tax credits for wind and solar developers: an 
investment tax credit, which incentivizes financiers to invest in costly projects, and a production 
tax credit that scales with the total output of a renewable energy facility.34 The PTC and ITC 
have since been extended several times, most recently in 2015. 
Recent price trends for power generating resources 
These mandates and incentives, coupled with the continuing restructuring of the 
electricity industry, helped provide the nascent wind and solar industries with a means by which 
to enter the marketplace. But it took three paradigm shifts, each of which has taken place within 
the past ten years, to enable those resources to become price-competitive with fossil fuels. The 
earliest of these paradigm shifts is the boom in shale gas extraction that took place in the late 
2000s, when advancements in horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing created extraction 
opportunities in previously inaccessible natural gas deposits. From 2005 through 2011, U.S. gas 
                                                             
30 Joskow, Paul. “U.S. Energy Policy During the 1990s.” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 
No. 8454. September 2001. 
31 “Xcel Energy Wind and Biomass Generation Mandate.” DSIRE, NC Clean Energy Technology Center. Database 
entry summarizes Minn. Stat. § 216B.2424. 
32 Barbose, Galen. “Renewable Portfolio Standards in the United States: A Status Update.” 2012 National Summit 
on RPS, Washington, DC, 3 December 2012. 
33 Tuttle 8. 
34 Goodward, Jenna and Mariana Gonzalez. “Bottom Line on Renewable Energy Tax Credits.” World Resources 
Institute. October 2010. 
Shenhar 18 
 
production increased by 27 percent, and the share of the overall U.S. gas market supplied via 
shale reserves increased from 4 percent to 30 percent.35 Due to this dramatic increase in 
production, the spot price of natural gas futures dropped from a peak of $8.86 per million Btu in 
2008 to $2.62 per million Btu in 2014.36 At that price point, natural gas is the cheapest available 
fuel for electricity generation, which explains why it now generates more of America’s power 
than any other resource. 
The coal industry, which had fueled at least a plurality of America’s power plants 
through the 20th century, struggled to compete with this price decline. In addition to the increased 
price competition from natural gas, coal suppliers have had to grapple with tightening 
environmental regulations pertaining to the quantity of toxic trace elements released during the 
combustion process, most notably a 2011 EPA ordinance that lowered the maximum allowable 
level of mercury emissions from coal-fired power plants.37 Those two factors have placed coal 
producers in an economic quandary: the price they would need to charge to turn a profit in the 
face of increasing operating costs is higher than the retail price of natural gas throughout most of 
the country.38 As a result, U.S. coal production dropped 10.3 percent between 2014 and 2015, 
and coal’s share of the power sector declined from 39 percent to 33 percent over the same time 
period.39 The coal industry also faced pressure from the Clean Power Plan, a 2015 executive 
order issued by Barack Obama that mandated a 32 percent reduction in carbon emissions from 
electricity generation by 2040. But the decline of the coal industry is likely to continue even after 
                                                             
35 Krupnick, Alan, et al. “Sector Effects of the Shale Gas Revolution in the United States.” Resources for the Future, 
July 2013. 
36 “Henry Hub Natural Gas Spot Price.” U.S. Energy Information Administration. 
37 “National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants From Coal and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam 
Generating Units and Standards of Performance for Fossil-Fuel-Fired Electric Utility, Industrial-Commercial 
Institutional, and Small Industrial Commercial-Institutional Steam Generating Units.” 40 Fed. Reg. 60 & 63, Vol. 
77, No. 32. 16 February 2012. 
38 The Full Cost of Electricity. UT Energy Institute, The University of Texas at Austin. 
39 2015 Annual Coal Report, U.S. Energy Information Administration. 3 November 2016. 
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President Donald Trump’s rescission of the CPP in March 2017. According to a survey of 
utilities conducted by Utility Dive after the 2016 presidential election, 79 percent of utilities 
project their use of coal to decline over the next ten years, with 52 percent projecting a 
significant decline.40 
While natural gas began to displace coal as America’s primary source of nonrenewable 
power, the prices of solar and wind inputs dropped precipitously (Figs. 5 & 6).41 42 For the wind 
industry, this drop largely stemmed from technological advancements that allowed developers to 
build taller turbines, which can harness stronger gusts and generate electricity more efficiently 
than their shorter counterparts.43 In the photovoltaic solar industry, prices began to fall when 
Chinese manufacturers bolstered by government subsidies entered the market in the mid-2000s, 
according to Dan Reicher and Jeffrey Ball of the Steyer-Taylor Institute for Energy Finance at 
Stanford University.44 With construction and labor costs lower than in the United States, China 
accounts for over 70 percent of the global supply of crystalline silicon solar panels. These 
catalysts set off a series of positive feedback loops within the wind and solar industries: after 
becoming cost-competitive enough to bid into competitive power markets, firms developed the 
institutional knowledge and economies of scale to work towards reducing labor and development 
costs. And private and federal research helped suppliers continually improve the capacity factors 
of their equipment – in other words, the percentage of installed capacity that ultimately reaches 
the grid. 
                                                             
40 “2017 State of the Electric Utility Survey.” Utility Dive. March 2017 
41 Naam, Ramez. “Smaller, cheaper, faster: Does Moore’s law apply to solar cells?” Scientific American, 16 March 
2011. 
42 Hunt, Tam. “Guest Post: The True Cost of Renewable Energy – Reality vs. the LA Times.” Greentech Media, 26 
September 2012. 
43 Wiser, Ryan and Mark Bolinger. “2015 Wind Technologies Market Report.” Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy. August 2016. 
44 Ball, Jefferey and Dan Reicher. “Making Solar Big Enough to Matter.” New York Times, 21 March 2017. 
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Figure 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 As a result, those downward price trends should continue in the years ahead. GTM 
Research, a leading market research firm in the energy sector, projects the price of solar inputs to 
fall below $1.00 per watt by 2020, which would help utility-scale solar compete with natural gas 
Figure 6 
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even outside of the sunniest markets.45 Meanwhile, a 2016 expert elicitation study on wind 
power reported an overwhelming consensus that prices will continue to decline through at least 
the intermediate future (Fig. 7).46 47 Neither projection takes into account the possibility of 
technological advancement, discussed further in Chapter 3. 
 
Figure 7 
 However, while declining input prices will help catalyze project development in an array 
of different markets, the extent to which America’s power grids boost their uptake of wind and 
solar power going forward largely relies on whether they are designed to integrate those 
resources. Unlike natural gas, coal, or nuclear power, wind and solar carry a degree of weather-
based variability that can threaten the stability of an electric grid ill-equipped to accommodate it. 
Complicating matters further, the flexibility with which renewables can be deployed – solar 
installations can range in size from a single unit on a roof or streetlight to a miles-long array of 
panels – has a profound influence on demand patterns in America’s power sector. 
                                                             
45 Gallagher, Ben. “U.S. Solar PV Price Brief H1 2016: System Pricing, Breakdowns and Forecasts.” GTM 
Research, June 2016. 
46 Wiser, Ryan, et al. “Expert elicitation survey on future wind energy costs.” Nature Energy. September 2016. 
47 Fig. 7 source: Donohoo-Vallett, Paul, et al. “Impact of Clean Energy R&D on the U.S. Power Sector.” National 
Renewable Energy Laboratory, Technical Report NREL/TP-6A20-67691, January 2017. 
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 California’s power market is a cautionary tale in how these emerging technologies can 
cause disruptions in the power sector. Because of its strong solar resource and the high 
population density of its urban areas, California has the highest annual generation potential for 
rooftop solar power of any state – theoretically, distributed solar can supply 43.6 percent of the 
state’s power needs.48 Accordingly, the state’s power grid must accommodate over 3,000 MW of 
residential solar, representing 32 percent of its total installed solar capacity as of 2015.49 On 
sunny midafternoons, that quantity of power creates a massive decline in the amount of power 
consumers demand from utilities, which in turn makes it difficult for natural gas plants or utility-
scale solar facilities to operate at a profit and often requires them to temporarily shut down to 
avoid oversupply. However, once the sun sets, the utility’s demand function ramps up quickly, 
which poses a challenge to the natural gas and coal plants that supply most of the state’s power 
after dark (Fig. 8).50 It also requires the state to curtail solar generation during periods of 
oversupply, which deflates their economic value – no power plant, solar or otherwise, can 
generate revenue while idle. In February 2017, CAISO issued a memorandum to its board of 
governors warning of the possibility of up to 8 GW of solar curtailment that spring.51 
 Section conclusion 
 Despite decades of policy incentives designed to create opportunities for renewable 
technologies to penetrate the electricity market, it took a recent series of cost declines, motivated 
by rapidly falling input and manufacturing costs, for wind and solar generation to compete with 
cheap natural gas as a major source of new power generation. Going forward, market design and 
                                                             
48 Gagnon, Pieter, et al. “Rooftop Solar Photovoltaic Technical Potential in the United States: A Detailed 
Assessment.” National Renewable Energy Laboratory, Technical Report NREL/TP-6A20-65298. January 2016. 26. 
49 Comstock, Owen. “California has nearly half of the nation’s solar electricity generating capacity.” Today in 
Energy, U.S. Energy Information Administration. 5 February 2016. 
50 Figure 8 source: “What the duck curve tells us about managing a green grid.” California Independent System 
Operator, 2016. 
51 Berberich, Steve. “Memorandum to ISO Board of Governors.” California Independent System Operator, 9 
February 2017. 
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grid infrastructure will become an increasingly strong indicator of how much renewable power a 
state or region can successfully develop. But for the time being, there is room for continued 
growth and development, particularly in markets with a strong resource base or high enough 
power prices to create a competitive market. The next chapter will evaluate what barriers exist to 
development today and how they influence a state’s ability to build out its renewable 
infrastructure. 
  
Figure 8 
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Chapter II: Today 
An empirical analysis of how state-level market characteristics affect renewable 
development 
 Section A: Prior Literature 
 Overall, the evidence that policy mechanisms positively affect renewable uptake is 
mixed. A 2009 study into renewable portfolio standards concluded that, all else held constant, 
RPS had no statistically significant effect on the percentage of renewables in a state’s power mix, 
although states with RPS tended to generate more renewable power in total than those without.52 
 There is similar debate as to whether restructuring in electricity markets has promoted or 
discouraged renewable integration. From an empirical standpoint, there is no conclusive 
evidence suggesting that whether a state’s power market is deregulated affects its deployment of 
renewables.53 From a theoretical standpoint, there are compelling arguments in either direction. 
Utilities in deregulated markets face greater pressure to procure the most cost-effective 
generation sources possible, which could preclude them from incentivizing or accommodating 
solar power and incentivize them to lobby against favorable renewable policies at the state 
level.54 However, investor-owned utilities in regulated markets are often compensated based on 
how much generating capacity they develop, a holdover provision of an era when rapidly 
constructing massive centralized power plants was the only way a utility could adequately 
electrify a region.55 That regulatory structure gives utilities in regulated markets a disincentive 
                                                             
52 Carley, Sanya. “State renewable energy electricity policies: An empirical evaluation of effectiveness.” Energy 
Policy, Vol. 37, May 2009. 
53 Kim, Sung Eun, et al. “Does Power Sector Deregulation Promote or Discourage Renewable Energy Policy? 
Evidence from the States, 1991-2012. Review of Policy Research, Vol. 33, Issue 1. January 2016. 22-50. 
54 Heiman, Mark and Barry Solomon. “Power to the People: Electric Utility Restructuring and the Commitment to 
Renewable Energy.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 94, Issue 1. 94-116. 
55 Aas, Dan and Michael O’Boyle. “You Get What You Pay For: Moving Toward Value in Utility Compensation, 
Part 2 – Regulatory Alternatives.” America’s Power Plan, June 2016. 
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against investing in distributed resources or renewables, which typically have a lower nameplate 
capacity than coal, nuclear, or baseload gas plants. 
 Previous studies have also found that tax incentives are, according to an overview by 
Sanya Carley and Tyler Browne, “best and most often used in a supporting or complementary 
role to other policy instruments.”56 In particular, tax incentives can “effectively promote the 
development of small-scale renewable installations…at the state level,” while providing less 
value to utility-scale installments. 
 There are two main contrasts between this model and those of previous studies. Firstly, 
this model includes variables that evaluate the effects of barriers to property development, 
particularly permitting restrictions surrounding federal and protected land as well as the 
Endangered Species Act and National Environmental Policy Act. A few other studies have 
accounted for a state’s predilection towards environmental protection using variables like Sierra 
Club membership, which might account for local enthusiasm towards preservationist causes but, 
as discussed below, does not encompass the full impact of environmental statutes. There have 
also been studies that describe how the environmental review process hinders power plant 
development in California specifically, although none that focus on renewables in particular. A 
report by the Bay Area Economic Forum in 2001 found that while the state’s byzantine 
regulations delayed new capacity additions, they “do not appear to have been a critical 
impediment to investment.”57 Secondly, this model divides utility-scale and distributed solar 
generation, allowing for an evaluation of whether certain policy categories have a greater impact 
                                                             
56 Carley, Sanya and Tyler R. Browne. “Innovative US energy policy: a review of states’ policy experiences.” 
WIREs Energy Environ 2013, Issue 2. 488-506. 
57 Bay Area Economic Forum, The Bay Area – A Knowledge Economy Needs Power, San Francisco, California. 2001. 
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on one sector of the solar industry or the other. Finally, the model uses many of the same 
regressors as previous studies, updated to include state-level power generation data from 2016. 
 In order to develop the model, I constructed a database with information on a state’s 
generating capacity for wind and solar power as well as for conventional resources. The database 
also includes details about a state’s underlying market characteristics, divided into three principle 
categories: 
 Economic variables include average land value, average power prices, income per 
capita, and percentage of land classified as developed by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
 Political variables include the number of regulations and incentives affecting wind and 
solar development, information about a state’s RPS program, and binary variables for policies 
like renewable energy credits, utility deregulation, and net metering. Other political variables 
included that do not directly pertain to the renewables industry are right-to-work policies and 
whether the state government is under Democratic or Republican control, included because of 
the extent to which developers cited union strength as a barrier to project development. 
 Environmental variables include the number and density of endangered species, amount 
and value of protected and federal land, and the number of lawsuits filed in a state under the 
National Environmental Policy Act between 2000 and 2015. 
 Section B: Results and analysis 
Like previous studies, this analysis finds a strong correlation between a state’s resource 
quality, measured in terms of its total potential output of wind or solar power, and its actual 
output. The correlation is particularly strong for wind, where resource quality was the only factor 
that yielded a statistically significant positive correlation with output, measured both in terms of 
a state’s total wind generation (MWh) and number of developed wind projects (Figure 9). Solar 
generation, including both distributed and utility-scale assets, is also strongly correlated with 
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generating potential, although factors like a state’s power prices and total number of solar 
policies also had statistically significant positive effects at the 5 percent level, while its wind 
potential had a statistically significant negative effect at the 10 percent level. More surprisingly, 
this analysis did not yield any statistically significant relationship between a state’s proclivity 
towards environmental litigation and the strength of either its wind or solar industry, measured 
both in terms of raw number of projects developed and share of total power generation. 
 
Figure 9 
 Environmental policy variables 
 Several developers suggested that the Endangered Species Act is a major impediment to 
constructing utility-scale distributed projects. According to the preponderance of developers 
consulted for this project, the effects of the ESA are particularly acute in states with a high 
percentage of federal land, because any project that requires developing generation or 
transmission capacity on federal property is subject to litigation under the National 
Environmental Policy Act. The stipulations established by those two federal laws alone can be so 
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complex that renewables companies often have positions specifically tasked with ensuring that 
they are complied with: EDF Renewable Energy, for example, employs a Permitting & 
Environmental Manager and an Environmental Strategy Director for that purpose.  Further 
complicating matters, the Bureau of Land Management and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Services 
delegate the permitting process to regional branches and offices, which can vary widely in terms 
of how quickly and reliably they approve projects. The director of origination for one 
development company with projects nationwide stated that his company tends to avoid working 
on federal land altogether for that reason, describing the permitting process as challenging and 
often arbitrary. 
It stands to reason, then, that the concentration of endangered species and the percentage 
of federal land in a given state should negatively influence that state’s renewable generating 
capacity. For instance, Andy Bowman, the former president of Pioneer Green Energy, cited 
California and Maryland as particularly difficult markets in which to develop wind projects due 
to their high concentrations of endangered birds and bats. Yet every developer consulted for this 
project, including Bowman, agreed that the challenges they face maneuvering around the ESA 
and NEPA have little to do with the presence of endangered species themselves. Instead, the 
laws are often manipulated by third party litigants out of self-interest. 
“Environmental laws often get used for nonenvironmental ends,” Monty Humble of 
Brightman Energy said. Humble further described NEPA and ESA as “content-neutral vehicles 
for litigation,” citing what he described as a particularly egregious example in which the 104-
MW Echanis wind project was scuttled by a NEPA suit brought by the Oregon Natural Desert 
Association.58 The Echanis project would have required the construction of a transmission line 
                                                             
58 “Echanis.” Columbia Energy Partners. 
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across BLM land, and ONDA claimed that the project’s developers had not adequately assessed 
whether the new infrastructure would impact the ground-dwelling greater sage grouse.59 In 
particular, ONDA was concerned that the transmission line would provide “perches for predatory 
raptors and corvids,” as well as create “noise or other project-related disturbances” that could 
fragment sage grouse habitat.60 The case made its way up to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, which reversed in part a lower-court decision in favor of the defendants and halted 
construction on the project. The majority opinion rejected the arguments raised by the plaintiffs 
in the case, but held that the BLM did not adequately measure a baseline sage grouse population 
in the affected territory before granting an easement to the developer, Columbia Energy Partners. 
Another developer cited labor unions as a frequent impediment to project construction, 
particularly in California. By threatening NEPA suits against any developer that uses contract 
labor, unions can extract concessions and demand higher wages on behalf of a project’s 
construction workers and maintenance crews. 
This study used the number of NEPA suits brought within a state between 2000 and 2015 
to evaluate the effects of endangered species populations, in addition to third parties that exploit 
the regulations that protect those species, on renewable development. There is a very strong 
positive correlation between the number of NEPA suits filed within a state and both the number 
and density of endangered species, as well as the amount of federally protected land, within that 
state.61 Furthermore, in line with the developer’s hypothesis, there is a statistically significant 
positive correlation between the political power wielded by labor unions (measured by whether 
                                                             
59 ONDA v. Jewell, No. 13-36078 (9th Cir. 2016). 2. 
60 ONDA v. Jewell. 10. 
61 The specdensity variable was calculated by dividing the number of endangered and threatened species in a state by 
its total acreage. Its statistical significance in Table 1 depends on the exclusion of Alaska and Hawaii from the 
regression, both of which are extreme outliers in terms of total land area and number of endangered species and for 
which there is no available data on the value of federal land. The species and righttowork variables remain 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level with Alaska and Hawaii included. 
Shenhar 30 
 
the state has adopted right-to-work legislation) in a state and the number of NEPA suits filed 
therein, as shown in Table 1.62 
 However, in contrast to the developers’ suspicions, this study found no statistically 
significant relationship between the number of NEPA suits filed in a state and the number of 
wind and solar projects commissioned in that state, as demonstrated in the wind and solar tables 
below. 
 Wind 
Table 2 presents the results of a multilinear regression model that assessed the impact of 
various policy mechanisms and power market characteristics on wind development, measured in 
terms of the percentage of a state’s total power generation that comes from wind projects.63 
 
Table 3 presents the same variables regressed on the overall number of wind projects in a 
state. I used both variables to assess whether states with low generating capacities have 
successfully incentivized smaller projects. Including wind projects as another dependent variable 
also allows this study to account for the possibility that high-output projects in states with strong 
wind potential could mask the negative effects of environmental regulations on the industry as a 
whole. Neither scenario appears in the data, and so Table 3 looks quite similar to Table 2. 
                                                             
62 The variables pctvalfed and pctdev refer to the percentage of a state’s total land value owned by the federal 
government and the percentage of the state’s land area classified as developed, respectively. 
63 Windpotentialmw: Wind potential (MW), according to the National Renewable Energy Laboratory 
    Solarpotential: Ranking in NREL’s Sun Index 
    Totalutilgen: Total utility generation (MW) 
    Windpol: Total number of policies and incentives that apply to wind developers 
    Rpsnum: Percentage of state’s electricity generation that must come from renewable sources by a certain year 
    Deregulated: Whether the state’s electricity market has undergone restructuring (binary variable) 
    Pctprotecttotal: Percentage of state’s land area classified as protected by the state or federal government 
    Specdensity: Number of endangered species in a state divided by the state’s total area (sqmi) 
    Pcekwh: Average electricity price, ($/kWh) 
    Valperacre: Average land value ($/acre) 
    Incpercap: Per-capita income 
    Sqmi: Area (sqmi) 
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 These results largely correspond to recent industry trends. Wind power is the cheapest 
source of electricity throughout much of the central U.S., including deeply conservative states 
with a political aversion to renewable incentives. As a result, states that lag behind the rest of the 
country in terms of renewable incentives, such as Wyoming, Kansas, and North Dakota, have 
some of the highest percentages of wind penetration in the country (Figure 10).64 Conversely, 
there are very few state-level policy mechanisms or incentives targeted specifically towards 
wind, and states with such incentives in place often face other barriers to wind development like 
small land areas and low quantities of available property. The fact that wind is most likely to 
succeed in the regions that are least likely to help it do so may explain why there is no 
correlation between a state’s political support for wind development and its actual generating 
output. 
 
Figure 10: Green represents counties in which wind is the cheapest power generating resource. 
Red corresponds to natural gas, yellow to subbituminous coal, and blue to nuclear. 
                                                             
64 Fig. 10 source: Full Cost of Electricity, University of Texas at Austin. 
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None of the variables that account for endangered species yield a statistically significant 
relationship with wind development.65 This result suggests that markets in which wind is price 
competitive are attractive to developers regardless of the hurdles that the ESA, NEPA, and their 
state-level equivalents introduce to the construction process. It is also possible that all power 
generating sources, including power plants, face similar environmental permitting barriers, 
mitigating the affect that those regulations have on the wind and solar industries. After 
controlling for other variables, this study also found no relationship between deregulated 
electricity markets and wind development. This result does not suggest, however, that market 
design plays no role in the renewable integration process. Chapter 3 discusses the influence of 
ISO policies on renewable power, with a special focus on ERCOT and CAISO. 
 Solar 
 There are more variables that influence a state’s total solar generation than there are that 
influence its wind generation. Some of that disparity stems from the effect of including 
California, responsible for 47 percent of America’s total solar generation and just under 50 
percent of its utility-scale solar generation – the gulf between California’s solar output and that 
of every other state is so wide that it can lead to spurious results. For that reason, Table 4 
excludes California, as well as the District of Columbia, which imports most of its power from 
Maryland and Virginia and generates almost none on its own, and Alaska and Hawaii, for which 
there is no available data on overall land development.66 
                                                             
65 The statistical significance of the nepa variable in Table 2 comes from California’s outlier status, with nearly 
twice as many NEPA suits filed as second-place Oregon and more wind installed (MW) than all but three other 
states. The relationship disappears with California removed from the regression. 
66 Because of its high power prices and lack of easily accessible land, nearly half of the power generated within 
DC’s limits comes from distributed solar resources. 
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 In contrast to the wind analyses above, the cumulative number of solar policies in a state 
does yield a statistically significant positive relationship (at the 5 percent level) with the 
percentage of that state’s total power generation drawn from solar resources. This analysis also 
included two binary variables representing types of policies only applicable to utility-scale solar 
developers: solar permitting, a regulatory barrier which I predicted would have a negative 
relationship with solar development, and solar renewable energy credits, which I predicted would 
have a positive relationship with solar development.67 While the presence of a SREC program 
positively correlated with pctgensolar, the permitting variable did not correlate at all with the 
dependent variable. Deregulated markets negatively correlated with solar development with 
significance at the 5 percent level, although this result may be influenced by the fact that most 
deregulated states are in the Northeast, where solar resource quality is weak, or in states with a 
stronger wind resource than solar like Texas, Oregon, and Illinois. There is some evidence that 
states with high wind power potential generate lower percentages of their power from solar, with 
windpotentialmw negatively correlating with pctgensolar at a 10 percent level of significance. 
Furthermore, NEPA suits did not have any adverse impact on a state’s solar generation, 
suggesting that, as with wind, environmental regulations that restrict the development of 
renewables do not negatively affect a state’s output of renewable power. The strongest predictor 
of solar power’s share of a state’s power generation, with significance at the 1 percent level, is 
power prices. In states where electricity is expensive for consumers, solar provides a greater 
share of the power supply. That largely stems from the fact that the economics of rooftop solar 
become more favorable as utility bills rise. 
                                                             
67 For a more comprehensive analysis of SRECs, see p. 46. 
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Taken together, these results suggest that without incentives, solar photovoltaics are not 
price-competitive with other forms of power generation in most electricity markets, even those in 
America’s sunnier states. At the same time, the results suggest an opening for solar power in 
regions with high power prices and a favorable regulatory structure. That may explain why wind 
potential negatively correlates with solar generation. In a state like Texas or Oklahoma with a 
strong resource of both solar and wind, the latter will likely attract more interest from developers 
and investors, since most incentives for renewable power apply to both wind and solar 
generation. In addition to the price differential between the two technologies, wind may also 
enjoy an advantage over solar in the form of its greater siting flexibility. Many developers 
discussed the ease of convincing private landowners to allow wind turbines on their property, 
since royalty payments are generally high and the propellers do not interfere with agriculture. 
Solar, for its part, requires a smaller amount of land overall, but cannot collocate with crops or 
livestock. “It’s almost like building a parking lot,” Bowman said of utility-scale solar 
development. States without a viable wind resource, in contrast, may derive value from 
incentivizing solar, to help businesses and households reduce the costs of their power 
consumption. 
To test whether these variables have a greater effect on utility-scale or distributed solar, I 
replaced pctgensolar with a solarutilprojects variable, representing the number of utility-scale 
solar projects developed by state without considering the installation’s size or generating 
capacity (Table 5). 
 In this regression, solar potential shows no relationship with the number of projects 
developed per state, and the most significant variable is the number of solar incentives, with a 
positive correlation and significance at the 1 percent level. Solar potential showed no significant 
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relationship with the overall number of projects developed, although wind potential still has a 
slight negative correlation with significance at the 10 percent level. Power price did not correlate 
with the number of utility-scale projects developed, suggesting that its relationship with overall 
solar generation in Table 4 stems from its effect on distributed solar. The positive relationship 
between developed land percentage and solar projects, significant at the 5 percent level, may 
stem from outliers like California, New Jersey, and North Carolina, but it suggests that similarly 
urbanized regions can benefit from utility-scale solar development with the right incentives in 
place. 
Other variables of note, both significant at the 10 percent level, are permitting 
requirements and density of endangered species. Permitting, a binary variable representing 
whether a state has adopted siting and zoning guidelines for solar installations, positively 
correlates with the number of projects. This may be a result of collinearity with the solarincent 
variable, which encompasses regulatory as well as financial policies, since states with such 
restrictions in place may be more likely to complement them with beneficial incentives. The 
negative correlation between endangered species density and project development may suggest 
that the Endangered Species Act poses barriers to utility-scale solar, or it could be an outgrowth 
of high species densities in small Northeastern states (Rhode Island, Delaware) and incentive-
less Southern states (Alabama, Tennessee) that are not good climates for utility-scale solar to 
begin with. 
Section C: Study limitations 
There were a few limitations that restrict the breadth of this study’s conclusion. The 
absence of county-level data likely influenced the results of the endangered species variables. 
Species density can vary dramatically within states, and so the problems developers spoke about 
in states like California and Oregon could have been overlooked in this study by the lack of more 
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granular data. A study evaluating the effect of endangered species density or protected habitat on 
development by county might affirm the hypothesis that environmental protections can adversely 
affect renewable integration. 
 This study also did not evaluate the magnitude of different incentive programs, which 
could have an influence on development overall. Some states offer more lucrative tax credits 
than others for production or investment, and cashback programs or tax abatements for 
commercial and residential procurers can also vary dramatically. 
 The RPS variable would have been more productive in a study using time-series data, 
which would help evaluate whether renewable buildout increases after an RPS is put in place. 
Dividing the NEPA data into its constituent years could also explain whether the prevalence of 
environmental litigation deters developers from working in a state in the future. 
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 Chapter III: Tomorrow 
 To what extent will the market characteristics described in Chapter 2 shape the future of 
the wind and solar industries? 
As Chapter 1 described, the U.S. wind industry is relatively nascent, and the solar 
industry newer still. So while the empirical results of Chapter 2 reveal an interesting snapshot of 
what factors influence the industry today, it is not clear ipso facto whether they carry any 
predictive value. This final chapter attempts to address that question with case studies into the 
market characteristics of some of the more renewable-friendly states, most notably Texas and 
California. It concludes with a discussion of how future developments beyond the scope of this 
analysis will affect the industry going forward, with a particular emphasis on federal policy 
under the Trump administration and the emergence of the energy storage industry. 
 Section A: Texas 
On the regulatory side, Texas has done little to either promote or slow the growth of 
renewables, with ERCOT and the PUC adopting a laissez-faire ethos that has benefitted wind 
and will likely do the same for solar as costs continue to decline. Two developers cited SB 277, 
which would render wind projects ineligible for tax credits if they are built within 30 nautical 
miles of a U.S. Air Force base, as a potential impediment to construction if it were to pass, but 
the bill is not currently on the intent calendar after passing through the Committee on Veteran 
Affairs and Border Security on a 4-3 vote.68 
There are two main reasons that this hands-off approach has helped spur the development 
of the renewables industry in Texas. The first is its geographic blessings: Texas has the sixth-best 
solar resource and second-best wind resource (trailing only Alaska) in the country, coupled with 
almost no endangered species or federal land to interfere with project development. The lack of 
                                                             
68 SB 277, 85th Texas State Legislature. 2017. 
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government-owned property is particularly impactful in the wind industry, where projects are 
often constructed without the developer purchasing any land at all, instead offering leasing fees 
and royalty payments to landowners in exchange for the right to construct turbines on their 
property. This process is often quite lucrative for landowners: in 2016, cotton farmer Rolan Petty 
told the MIT Technology Review that he earns $7,500 annually on each of the several turbines 
installed on his estate. And it spares wind developers, whose projects often require dozens of 
square miles of territory, the high upfront cost of purchasing that land outright. This 
arrangement, however, is only possible on private land, since the permitting process for 
developing federal property is both arduously long and easy to litigate.69 
The second structural advantage that the Texas power market presents to renewable 
developers is its exemption from FERC oversight. As the only state in the country with its own 
independent power grid, separate from both the Eastern and Western Interconnections, the 
ERCOT market largely operates under its own set of regulations, with frequent input from a 
Board of Directors and various advisory committees comprised of industry stakeholders.70 That 
degree of independence gives the Public Utilities Commission of Texas an outsized role in 
setting the state’s energy policy. Meanwhile, the direct interactivity among policymakers and the 
private sector that ERCOT provides allows the state to move relatively quickly on designing a 
marketplace that suits the state’s political vision. In tandem, these factors provided the state with 
tremendous leeway to facilitate wind development once it became clear that wind energy was 
price-competitive with conventional generating resources, and particularly after the scorching 
                                                             
69 Groom, Nichola. “U.S. Seeks to speed wind, solar development on federal lands.” Reuters, 10 November 2016. 
70 “Committees and Groups.” Electric Reliability Council of Texas. 
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summer and frigid winter of 2011 caused rolling blackouts across the state due largely to a 
shortage of natural gas.71 
The Texas wind boom began in earnest in 2005, when the state first announced plans to 
develop a $7 billion network of high-voltage power lines that would directly transfer electrons 
from the windy regions of West Texas to load centers in the rest of the state. At the time, natural 
gas in Texas cost $7.62 per thousand cubic feet, and the state was angling to meet an RPS that 
called for 5,000 MW of renewable generation by 2015. In the years between the project’s 
commencement and its completion in 2013, the capital costs of wind declined, and investors saw 
wind power as a hedge against the possibility of price volatility in the natural gas market. By the 
time the 18,500 MW Competitive Renewable Energy Zone (CREZ) lines joined the grid, 
ERCOT operators were reviewing 21,000 MW worth of projects.72 
The strain that Texas’s installed wind capacity has placed upon the power grid may raise 
the cost of future wind projects, which will not be able to regularly transmit the electricity they 
generate from their rural node points to the load centers that comprise most of the state’s power 
demand. That has created an opportunity for utility-scale solar in the state, particularly as its 
input and installation costs continue to decline. Although West Texas has a much stronger solar 
resource than East Texas, at least two major developers are exploring the possibility of 
developing sites in the latter, where transmission costs are lower and there is no need to compete 
with wind developers over access to power lines. Texas’s installed utility-scale solar capacity has 
already nearly doubled in recent years, jumping from 288 MW to 556 MW from 2015 to 2016, 
and ERCOT projects that number to increase to 2,575 MW by 2020, based exclusively on 
                                                             
71 Galbraith, Kate. “The Rolling Chain of Events Behind Texas Blackouts.” Texas Tribune, 3 Feb 2011. 
72 Malewitz, Jim. “$7 Billion New Wind Power Project Nears Finish.” Texas Tribune, 14 October 2013. 
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contracts that have already been signed.73 Looking ahead, ERCOT projects solar to account for 
nearly all capacity additions to the grid over the next 15 years.74 
Whether that scenario leads to power price volatility and supply intermittency is unclear. 
A number of public officials and grid experts in the state who offered their assessments under the 
condition of anonymity suggested that because solar and wind are naturally complementary, with 
wind generating more power at night and during the winter, grid operators should be able to 
manage some degree of variability in the power supply. A window around 7 p.m., when solar 
will go offline but wind production will not yet have peaked, could pose issues if the state’s 
baseload natural gas production declines. However, Texas’s wind and solar capacity installments 
are both so new that there have been no studies into how seasonal variability and long-range 
weather patterns like El Niño would affect power generation. 
Section B: California 
In keeping with its reputation as one of America’s more environmentally conscious 
states, California has a long record of offering public support for renewable energy. The state has 
had an aggressive RPS in place since 2002, as well as more policies affecting the solar and wind 
industries than any other state. It also has a history of bad air pollution, which previous studies 
on energy policy have suggested correlates with a state’s affinity for renewables-friendly 
policies.75 Correspondingly, California generated more wind energy than all but four other states 
in 2016. And its 580,752 solar projects generated 25,011 MWh of energy that same year, more 
than quintupling the output of second-placed Arizona.76 Going forward, the state plans to 
accelerate its public support for renewables even further: In February, State Senate Majority 
                                                             
73 Ragsdale, Kenneth. “ERCOT Overview and Integration of Renewables.” ERCOT, 8 February 2017. 
74 Borkar, Sandeep, et al. “2016 Long-Term System Assessment for the ERCOT Region.” ERCOT, December 2016. 
75 Carley, 2009. 
76 California Solar Statistics. 
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Leader Kevin de Leon (D-Los Angeles) introduced an updated RPS that would require 
California to procure 100 percent of its power from renewables by 2045.77 Because of the 
logistical challenges of wind development California, coupled with its strong solar resource, 
most of that new generating capacity will come in the form of solar. That transition is already 
underway, as wind development has tapered off as solar development has accelerated in 
California over the past few years (Figures 11 and 12).78 
 
Figure 11 
                                                             
77 SB 584, California Legislature – 2017-18 Regular Session. “California Renewable Portfolio Standards Program.” 
78 Figures 10 and 11 source: Electricity Data Browser, U.S. Energy Information Administration. 
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Figure 12 
 
But whether the state can maintain a reliable and affordable power grid in light of its 
aggressive approach towards renewable development remains a matter of debate. In his keynote 
address at the American Council on Renewable Energy’s annual policy forum, Michael Picker, 
the president of the California Public Utilities Commission, spoke of California’s need to 
transition into a “post-renewables future” and stated his opposition to the proposed RPS update.79 
 As discussed briefly in Chapter 1, California’s electric grid has already faced two 
interconnected logistical challenges, one logistical and one financial, pertaining to its increasing 
integration of solar energy. The root of the problem is that while solar energy is abundant in the 
middle of the day, the generating capacity of solar installations declines rapidly in the early 
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evening. Further complicating matters, solar energy is cheap enough during its peak hours -- 
particularly with subsidies as extensive as California’s -- that grid operators need to turn off coal 
and natural gas plants to prevent overgeneration. That means that those same coal and gas plants 
must come back online quickly in the early evening (refer to Figure 8 in Chapter 1 for a visual 
representation of this phenomenon), which is part of why California has higher power prices than 
any state within the continental U.S. outside of New England. For the solar industry, the 
financial consequence of this variability is that the marginal value of solar power declines 
quickly as solar capacity increases, which will make solar projects progressively more expensive 
to develop in markets that already have a high level of solar integration.80 81 In fact, without 
advancements in energy storage technology, further solar development in California might 
become economically unviable altogether.82 According to an NREL study on California’s solar 
market, “as curtailment increases, the benefits of additional PV may drop to the point where 
additional installations are not worth the cost, creating an economic limit to deployment.”83 
 These emerging limitations to solar integration in California are exacerbated by the 
state’s difficult development process. While the state’s nation-leading number of NEPA lawsuits 
has not diminished its cumulative solar development to date, as demonstrated by the regressions 
in Chapter 2, California still requires developers to submit a full environmental impact 
assessment under a provision of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQuA), One 
developer described this process as “very expensive and time-consuming,” largely because it 
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requires public hearings that can gin up orthogonal complaints about the development process. 
And because there are already 460 utility-scale solar installations in California, more than in any 
other state, most of the most promising sites have already been developed, with the remaining 
sites rendered less attractive to investors due to some combination of a lower resource quality 
and more expensive land. As a result, not only does each solar installation diminish the value of 
the energy produced by every other solar panel on the grid, but it also raises the initial cost of 
each subsequent solar installation after controlling for technological improvements. 
 A few of the developers I consulted also took issue with CAISO’s management of 
California’s power sector, with one describing the organization as “punitive” and another using 
the term “laughable.” For instance, unlike ERCOT, CAISO requires developers to pay for the 
right to interconnection into the state’s transmission system when a project first begins 
construction, rather than at the point of completion. This pricing mechanism has proved 
challenging for renewable developers, since projects in California can take longer to complete 
than those in other states because of the environmental impact standards set by CEQuA. And 
since California has not invested in a publicly funded transmission buildout like the Texas CREZ 
lines beyond incremental improvements to the 3220 MW Pacific DC Intertie, some developers 
worry about the prospect of being required to pay to upgrade the lines on which they transmit the 
power they generate.84 “It’s like a guillotine at the end of the process,” Andy Bowman said. He 
estimated that transmission upgrade payments can cost a developer between $10 million and 
$100 million. 
 Part of why the CAISO market poses such a challenge for developers is that the 
deregulation of California power sector initially yielded disastrous consequences for the state, 
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with price fluctuations and rolling blackouts costing consumers $40 billion in added energy costs 
from 2000 through 2002.85 California began the deregulating process in 1996, when it opened its 
power markets to merchant generators independent of its three main electric utilities.86 However, 
by 2000, weather-related increases in peak demand and decreases in hydropower generation, 
combined with “regulatory uncertainty” and an underdeveloped power market that relied heavily 
on spot trading, caused pervasive and repeated problems with undersupply.87 In response to these 
market failures, the state placed limitations on retail choice while still allowing merchant 
generators to sign bilateral contracts to directly supply power to particular utilities.88 In recent 
years, that unorthodox model of partial deregulation has hamstrung its utilities’ ability to 
accommodate distributed resources, according to Picker.89 Furthermore, the crisis sowed an 
environment of distrust among the Public Utilities Commission, state legislature, and CAISO 
that “fragmented” California’s regulatory regime, leading to “overlaps and conflict” among 
various stakeholders.90 This political chaos has turned a number of developers and financiers 
away from the California market. One former commodity trader described a number of instances 
in which state regulators would retroactively impose a new rule onto a preexisting generating 
asset, leading his firm to look elsewhere for investment opportunities. 
 Between its underdeveloped transmission infrastructure and flawed power markets, 
California still faces limits on how much value it can extract from its public investments in solar 
power, even as its strong RPS standards and incentive programs helped the state’s solar industry 
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emerge from nascence. To address the problem, CAISO has advocated for the creation of an 
interstate energy imbalance market, which would allow for energy trading across state lines 
within the Western Interconnection region. That would allow California to offload some of its 
solar power to neighboring states rather than curtail it during the day, while importing wind and 
coal power from those same states at night. There are clear economic benefits to such 
partnerships. A study conducted by the consultancy Energy + Environmental Economics and 
commissioned by CAISO found that ratepayers would save between $1.8 billion and $6.8 billion 
between 2015 and 2024 as a result of PacifiCorp, which manages generating assets in Oregon 
and Utah, merging into California’s power market in April 2015.91 However, no other companies 
or states have followed suits, and Picker does not expect any upcoming changes to the status quo 
due to the importance of in-state power generation to coal-dominant Rocky Mountain states. 
“Elected public utility commissioners in states like Montana, Utah, and Wyoming will not let 
California electrons into their markets,” Picker said in his address at ACORE.92 “They would be 
replaced overnight.” 
 Section C: Other notable states 
While Texas and California are the two most developed markets for wind and solar 
power in the U.S., other states have adopted innovative programs that provide useful case studies 
into how market and policy mechanisms can affect renewable deployment. 
New Jersey 
Amazingly, there are over three times as many utility-scale solar projects in New Jersey 
as there are in Arizona, despite the latter’s abundant sunshine and relatively inexpensive land 
prices. That strange statistic stems from New Jersey’s solar renewable energy credit (SREC) 
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market, which it established to create a financial incentive for solar generation. The owners of 
rooftop and utility-scale solar projects earn one SREC for each kilowatt of solar energy they 
generate, and the state determines the value of the instrument at annual auctions.93 In its first few 
years of operation, SREC values stayed above $600 per kilowatt, which allowed utility-scale 
solar installations to compete in New Jersey’s deregulated wholesale market. However, the 
market began to slow down around 2011, and the credit’s volatile value made long-term 
investments a challenge, according to Bowman.94 The rise and fall of New Jersey’s utility-scale 
solar market suggests that, in line with this study’s empirical analysis of cumulative solar project 
development, there is a causal relationship between how lucratively a state incentivizes solar 
generation and how many projects are built in that state. 
New York 
New York has taken the opposite approach to incentivizing solar power, with a heavy 
focus on distributed generation. In 2014, Governor Andrew Cuomo launched a comprehensive 
State Energy Plan to complement New York’s RPS, which calls for 50 percent renewable 
generation by 2030. In addition to the state’s Clean Energy Fund and New York Green Bank, 
which are designed to attract private capital into financing large-scale renewable generation, the 
state has invested over $1 billion in solar energy, with an emphasis on facilitating solar 
development in schools and small communities.95 That initiative contributed to a 575 percent 
increase in New York’s solar generating capacity between 2012 and 2015. To date, over 83.5 
percent of the state’s solar power output comes from distributed resources.96 
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To prevent that outgrowth of rooftop and community solar from creating the same 
logistical challenges that California’s grid is currently facing, New York has proposed a unique 
compensation model for its regulated electric utilities, which would require them to provide 
distributed system platform (DSP) services to distributed generators in exchange for new 
incentives in the “ratemaking paradigm.”97 Essentially, the program would help utility 
companies like Consolidated Edison (ConEd) transition from transmitting and distributing power 
themselves to providing operational services on behalf of a decentralized grid in a role similar to 
that of an air traffic controller.98 At the heart of this project is the Brooklyn/Queens Demand 
Management Program (BQDM), under which ConEd will provide an anticipated 22 MW 
increase in summer peak demand in 2017 and 2018 entirely via demand response and energy 
efficiency initiatives.99 If successful, BQDM would replace a proposed $1 billion substation that 
the two boroughs would otherwise need to satisfy peak demand.100 More broadly, the program 
could serve as a model for how similarly urbanized states can leverage distributed solar 
generation into an affordable and reliable asset. 
Section D: Looking ahead 
Storage 
 Every developer, financier, and regulator I consulted for this project cited battery storage 
as the single factor most likely to fundamentally transform the power sector. By balancing the 
intermittency of solar and wind power, battery storage would prevent problems with oversupply 
and curtailment like those plaguing California, as well as the challenges with congestion that 
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Texas has faced in the CREZ regions. Within a distributed framework, battery storage would 
allow commercial and residential solar producers to store their excess power rather than selling it 
back to the transmission and distribution provider, enabling them to disconnect from the grid 
altogether. 
 Whether either of these scenarios will be viable in the near or intermediate future is 
unclear. In November 2016, the first two large utility-scale lithium-ion batteries went online in 
California, when Pacific Gas and Electric’s 2 MW Vaca-Dixon and 4 MW Yerba Buena systems 
began providing ancillary services within the CAISO market.101 After a 2016 methane leak from 
the Aliso Canyon natural gas storage plant in California raised concerns of rolling blackouts in 
the state, other utilities in Southern California followed suit, and there are now over 1,800 MW 
of battery storage projects nationwide that should come online by 2021.102 However, with such a 
small installed capacity, it is difficult to evaluate how these utility-scale battery installations will 
affect power markets going forward. 
The economic viability of distributed battery storage largely depends on the strength of a 
state’s net metering policies for rooftop solar owners. A study from the Rocky Mountain Institute 
found that solar and storage systems are already competitive in Hawaii, where power prices are 
higher than in any other state due to the exorbitant costs of importing fossil fuels, and will soon 
reach that point in New York and California.103 However, a follow-up study found that “the 
financial case for grid defection in the U.S. is limited or nonexistent given current costs and 
policies,” with revisions to net metering policies in Hawaii and California providing a lower-cost 
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alternative to solar and storage systems in the technology’s two most promising locations.104 
Further complicating matters, the inefficiencies of battery storage can increase household energy 
consumption, meaning that “home energy storage would not automatically reduce emissions or 
energy consumption unless it directly enables renewable energy.”105 
Federal policy 
 Because federal incentives for renewable development apply evenly across states, they 
are not conducive to comparing policy regimes or market characteristics at the state level. But 
they still play a large role in influencing the affordability of renewable power.106 One financier 
who assisted with this project said that without the federal investment tax credit, wind power 
would be nearly impossible to construct anywhere in the country. As a result, President Donald 
Trump’s overtures in favor of reviving the coal industry sent shockwaves through the industry in 
the aftermath of his election, with most major renewable developers seeing their stock prices fall 
even as the rest of the market rose in the days after the November 2016 election.107 However, 
most industry experts do not foresee federal intervention slowing the development of renewables 
over the next few years. Ethan Zindler, the head of policy analysis at Bloomberg New Energy 
Finance, said at the ACORE Policy Forum that while Trump’s proposed federal budget “used a 
hatchet, not a scalpel” in its approach to cutting energy subsidies, the wind and solar industries 
should see few short-run consequences because most power contracts are signed so far in 
advance.108 In the long run, Zindler warned that cuts to the Department of Energy’s research and 
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development budget, including the Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (ARPA-E), 
could damage the industry by restricting the emergence of new renewable energy technologies. 
However, those consequences would have little impact on the deployment of current wind and 
solar technologies and thus fall beyond the scope of this analysis. 
Section E: Conclusion 
The beginning of Chapter 1 alludes to an interesting incongruity in America’s power 
markets: if resource quality and political support are the most important factors driving the 
development of renewables, why is it that New Jersey has over three times as many utility-scale 
solar projects as Arizona? Or that Oklahoma generates more wind power than California? 
Chapter 2 sought to answer those questions by evaluating what combination of political 
incentives, market characteristics, environmental regulations, and geographic variables correlate 
with a state’s renewable energy generating capacity. The analysis revealed that while wind 
production strongly corresponds to wind potential, meaning that the windiest states produce the 
most wind, solar production can vary widely based on the strength of a state’s incentive regime, 
in addition to factors like resource quality and the availability of competing resources. 
Chapter 3 took a deeper look into a few particularly notable power markets to evaluate 
whether any particular programs or structures that help the renewables market in some states can 
be adopted in other states as well. It concluded that besides deregulating power markets to 
provide utilities with access to more flexible sources of power generation, the only way for a 
state to reliably boost solar generation through policy mechanisms is to subsidize production far 
above market value, as New Jersey did through its ill-fated SREC program. ISOs, for their part, 
can design market rules and mechanisms intended to spur renewable development, but are 
subject to federal oversight outside of Texas and, according to a few of the renewable developers 
consulted for this project, often beholden to the interests of local fossil fuel developers. 
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The takeaway for policymakers is that, particularly in the solar industry, the effectiveness 
of state incentives depends on both the state’s immutable market characteristics and broader 
regulatory structures as much as it does on the lucrativeness of those incentives. Conversely, 
states with little interest in accommodating renewables onto their grids may be forced to do so by 
market forces pushing the costs of solar and wind power downward. Every day that the sun still 
shines and the wind still blows, the question of how much states must spend to incentivize 
renewable development gets easier to answer. Whether or not state governments are paying 
attention is another question altogether. 
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Appendix I: Regression tables 
 
The Effect of Environmental and Political Variables on NEPA Lawsuits (2000-2015) 
 
Table 1 
The Effect of Environmental, Political, and Economic Variables on Wind Generation 
(percentage of total power generation) 
 
Table 2 
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The Effect of Environmental, Political, and Economic Variables on Wind Development 
(number of projects) 
 
 
Table 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Shenhar 55 
 
The Effect of Environmental, Political, and Economic Variables on Solar Generation 
(percentage of total power generation) 
 
 
Table 4 
 
The Effect of Environmental, Political, and Economic Variables on Solar Development 
(number of utility-scale projects) 
 
 
Table 5 
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